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LUIS V. UNITED STATES: ASSET 
FORFEITURE BUTTS HEADS WITH 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
JORDAN GLASSBERG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Asset forfeiture, or the government’s seizure of property 
connected to illegal activities, has vastly increased in recent years, 
both in scope and in the public’s consciousness.1 Criminal forfeiture, 
as opposed to civil, “allows the government to take property from 
defendants when they are convicted for particular substantive 
crimes.”2 Though forfeiture has existed since early civilizations,3 
historically it has been disfavored in the United States.4 The federal 
government only began asserting forfeiture powers in 1970 as part of 
an effort to combat serious drug crimes.5 
The debate over asset forfeiture can be heated: proponents assert 
its usefulness just as loundly as critics declare its harms. The Justice 
Department emphasizes that forfeiture is a proper tool of law 
enforcement because it “removes the tools of crime from criminal 
organizations, deprives wrongdoers of the proceeds of crimes, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017. 
 1.  See generally John Burnett, Seized Drug Assets Pad Police Budgets, NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO (July 15, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91490480; 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014), 
https://youtu.be/3kEpZWGgJks. 
 2.  SARAH N. WELLING, ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS: 
CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO 560 (1998). 
 3.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation et. al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 18, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015) (discussing asset 
forfeiture in ancient Asia and in early English common law); see also Michael Todd King, Note, 
Expanding the Courts’ Power to Preserve Forfeitable Assets: The Pretrial Restraint of Substitute 
Assets Under RICO and CCE, 29 GA. L. REV. 245, 247 (1994) (tracing forfeiture back to ancient 
Western civilizations). 
 4.  See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682–86 (1974) 
(discussing the history of American forfeiture). 
 5.  See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 
(2012); see generally Welling, supra note 2, at 562 (describing the beginnings of federal asset 
forfeiture). 
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recovers property that may be used to compensate victims, and deters 
crime.”6 On the other hand, forfeiture has been criticized for 
extracting guilty pleas from defendants fearful of losing their 
property,7 and as a method used to pad the government’s own 
budget.8 
Adding to the debate is the implementation of pretrial restraint of 
assets, which is the government’s ability to freeze, prior to trial, any 
assets the government believes will ultimately be found forfeitable. 
Such pretrial restraint is authorized under federal law.9 The exercise 
of this government power potentially implicates the constitutional 
rights of defendants wishing to utilize those restrained assets to hire 
an attorney for an impending criminal trial. Specifically, the Sixth 
Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”10 This right has been interpreted to require that a defendant 
be able to secure counsel of his own choice,11 a choice that has been 
described as “the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”12 
The Supreme Court has already determined that a defendant does 
not have the right to pay counsel with tainted assets that are directly 
traceable to a crime.13 But Luis v. United States,14 a case recently taken 
by the Supreme Court, provides a new wrinkle to this problem. In 
Luis, the government was unable to locate the defendant’s tainted 
assets, and so sought to restrain other assets of the defendant’s, so-
 
 6.  RICHARD WEBER, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS, Introduction, 55 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULL. 6, Nov. 2007, at 1; 
see also Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) (“Forfeitures help to ensure that 
crime does not pay . . . .”); Gerald E. McDowell, Letter to the Editor, Why Prosecutors Choose 
Civil Forfeiture, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/05/opinion/l-why-
prosecutors-choose-civil-forfeiture-063487.html (providing a Department of Justice perspective 
on why forfeiture is pursued). 
 7.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 24, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Brief 
Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation]. 
 8.  See Stewart Powell, U.S. Asset Forfeitures Skyrocket, TIMES UNION (New York City) 
(May 25, 2013), http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/U-S-asset-forfeitures-skyrocket-
4549149.php (describing asset forfeiture as “a slush fund for the federal government” (quoting 
Senator Charles Grassley)). 
 9.  Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012). 
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 11.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
 12.  United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 13.  See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989) discussed 
infra Part II. 
 14.  Luis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2798 (June 8, 2015). 
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called “substitute assets,” under 18 U.S.C. § 1345.15 Thus, Luis presents 
the novel of whether the government may restrain a defendant’s 
substitute assets when any tainted assets cannot be located, even if 
doing so deprives the defendant of the ability to hire an attorney of 
the defendant’s own choosing.16 
This Commentary will first explore the factual and legal 
background that will influence the Court’s analysis, as well as the 
arguments presented by each side. Though many amici briefs have 
been filed asserting the consequences of allowing restraint of 
substitute assets, the Court should still allow the government this 
power. Although courts continue to debate the statutory 
interpretation question of whether the language in federal forfeiture 
statutes permits pretrial restraining of substitute assets,17 this 
Commentary will concentrate on the constitutional and policy-based 
questions that the Court will face. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Sila Luis, an owner of a health-care business, was indicted on 
October 2, 2012 and charged with “paying and conspiring to pay 
illegal kickbacks for patient referrals, and conspiring to defraud 
Medicare by billing for unnecessary or underperformed services.”18 
The indictment sought forfeiture of $45 million in Medicare 
reimbursements, the same amount that Luis’s companies are alleged 
to have fraudulently received.19 Luis’s assets were restrained under 18 
U.S.C. § 982, a statute that orders forfeiture for Medicare fraud.20 
Section 982 states that any forfeiture it authorizes “shall be governed 
by the provisions of . . . 21 U.S.C. § 853.”21 Section 853, in turn, allows 
for forfeiture of substitute property.22 This means that if any tainted 
 
 15.  Brief for the United States at 6–8, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Sept. 30, 
2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. 
 16.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Oct. 7, 
2014) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari]. 
 17.  Compare United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
RICO statute does not authorize pretrial restraint of substitute assets) and United States v. 
Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (same) with United States v. Patel, 949 F. Supp. 2d 
642, 654 (W.D. Va. 2013) (holding that § 982 covers substitute assets). 
 18.  Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner]. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2012). 
 21.  Id. § 982(b)(1). 
 22.  Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(2) (2012). 
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assets cannot be located or have been transferred, “the court shall 
order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant, up to the 
value of [the tainted] property.”23 Based on information that Luis’s 
fraudulently-obtained proceeds had already been transferred to 
various properties and bank accounts, the government pursued 
forfeiture of Luis’s substitute assets.24 
The government simultaneously brought an action to temporarily 
restrain the same substitute assets under 18 U.S.C. § 1345.25 The 
district court entered a temporary restraining order on October 3, 
2012.26 Luis argued that restraining her personal untainted assets 
prevented her from mounting a defense, as her case would require 
reviewing “records of . . . more than 1,900 Medicare patients and 1,000 
other patients,” and thereby violated her Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights.27 
The government subsequently sought to convert its restraining 
order into a preliminary injunction.28 A hearing was held on February 
6, 2013, at which an FBI agent testified as to the information leading 
to Luis’s charges and provided declarations that Luis was transferring 
money gained from her fraudulent activities to shell corporations, 
luxury items, real estate, and travel.29 The parties subsequently 
stipulated that some of the accounts and real estate subject to the 
restraining order contained assets not directly connected to the 
indictment.30 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although the right to choose one’s counsel has been held to be 
the basis of the Sixth Amendment,31 this right is circumscribed in 
numerous ways.32 One limit is that “a defendant may not insist on 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 6–8. 
 25.  Id. at 6; see also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345(a)(2) 
(2012) (allowing for a restraining order from using or disposing of property derived from certain 
federal crimes, including healthcare offenses). 
 26.  Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. 
Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Opposition]. 
 27.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 7. 
 28.  Id. at 6. 
 29.  United States v. Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla. 2013) aff’d per curiam, 
564 F. App’x 493 (11th Cir. 2014) cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2798 (June 8, 2015). 
 30.  Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 10. 
 31.  See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 32.  See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 
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representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”33 In 1989, the 
Supreme Court confronted two cases questioning whether the federal 
government could restrain assets that were directly attributed to a 
crime even if the defendant wanted to use those assets to pay for a 
private attorney.34 Decided on the same day, United States v. Monsanto 
and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States together stand for 
the proposition that “a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to 
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, 
even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to 
retain the attorney of his choice.”35 Monsanto found the statutory 
language of 21 U.S.C. § 853 to be unambiguous: there was no 
exception providing for assets that may be neecessary to pay an 
attorney.36 
Caplin considered the constitutional dimensions of this question,37 
and rejected “any notion of a constitutional right to use the proceeds 
of crime to finance an expensive defense.”38 The Court concluded that 
a pretrial restraint of tainted assets was legitimate given the “strong 
governmental interest in obtaining full recovery of the assets . . . [and] 
to lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug 
enterprises.”39 The Court asserted that pursuing forfeiture also 
“supports law-enforcement efforts in a variety of important and 
useful ways.”40 Although the defendant desired to hire private counsel, 
the Court ruled that he had adequate alternatives such as finding an 
attorney willing to represent him for a lower price or relying on 
representation by appointed counsel.41 Caplin, therefore, found the 
burden placed on a defendant to be only limited,42 and that the 
governmental interests overrode this limited burden.43 The Court 
likewise dismissed the argument that this practice could lead to 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. 
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
 35.  Caplin, 491 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added). 
 36.  Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 606. 
 37.  Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623. 
 38.  Id. at 630 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Patel, 949 F. Supp. 2d 642, 656–
57 (W.D. Va. 2013) (summarizing Caplin’s rationale). 
 39.  Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625; see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614 (“In enacting § 853, 
Congress decided to give force to the old adage that ‘crime does not pay.’”). 
 40.  Caplin, 491 U.S. at 629. 
 41.  Id. at 624–25. 
 42.  Id. at 625. 
 43.  See id. at 631. 
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prosecutorial abuse.44 The Court stated that there exists no claim 
when a prosecutorial tool merely could lead to abuse, because 
“[e]very criminal law carries with it the potential for abuse.”45 
Four Justices provided a joint dissent to Monsanto and Caplin.46 
Written by Justice Blackmun, the dissent expressed concern that the 
majority trivialized the burden that forfeiture placed on a defendant 
and enforced a system in which prosecutors could “beggar those it 
prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial.”47 The dissent also 
reweighed the interests of both parties, concluding that the 
government’s interest in forfeiture was only hypothetical until the end 
of trial while the defendant’s interest was real and immediate.48 Not 
permitting a defendant to hire his own counsel threatened “the trust 
between attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a 
truly effective advocate,”49 and the “truly equal and adversarial 
presentation of the case.”50 Instead, the dissent argued that section 853 
violated the Sixth Amendment.51 
Since Caplin, some circuit courts have confronted the specific 
issue in Luis, i.e., whether substitute assets may also be restrained 
pretrial. The Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have 
concluded that pretrial restraint of substitute assets is not allowed, 
primarily based on the language of the statute.52 The courts that have 
held that it should be allowed, most notably the Fourth Circuit and 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, have based their determination 
mainly on the rationale behind forfeiture.53 Relying largely on Caplin, 
In re Assets of Billman explained that substitute assets may be 
 
 44.  Id. at 634. 
 45.  Id. (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 
637, 648 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
 46.  Id. at 635–56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Id. at 635. 
 48.  See id. at 645–49, 653 (discussing interests for both the federal government and the 
defendants). 
 49.  Id. at 645. 
 50.  Id. at 648. 
 51.  See id. at 651 (“[A]ttorney’s-fee forfeiture substantially undermines every interest 
served by the Sixth Amendment right to chosen counsel . . . .”). 
 52.  United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Riley, 78 F.3d 
367, 370–71 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362–63 (9th Cir. 1994); In re 
Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1359 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 502 (5th 
Cir. 1993). 
 53.  In re Assets of Billman, 915 F.2d 916, 917 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Schmitz, 153 
F.R.D. 136, 141 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see also Welling, supra note 2, at 610 (“These courts cite the 
purpose of forfeiture law as a whole to prevent dissipation of assets . . . .”). 
GLASSBERG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2016  5:02 PM 
2016] ASSET FORFEITURE BUTTS HEADS WITH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 63 
untainted, in that they are not directly attributed to a crime, but they 
are still forfeitable, as they are expressly allowed to be forfeited by 
statute.54 Because Caplin already affirmed that the government’s 
pretrial seizure of assets does not disturb the Sixth Amendment, the 
Billman court stated that there was no distinction between tainted 
and substitute assets.55 It held that both may be similarly restrained.56 
III.  HOLDING 
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida converted 
the government’s temporary restraining order into a preliminary 
injunction57 based on a finding of probable cause that health care 
offenses had been committed58 and that the associated assets had been 
transferred or destroyed.59 The court rejected Luis’s Sixth 
Amendment argument and held that the language of section 1345 
allows that “when some of the assets that were obtained as a result of 
fraud cannot be located, a person’s substitute, untainted assets may be 
restrained instead.”60 The court specifically noted that the Sixth 
Amendment right to choose counsel is limited.61 It then expanded on 
an analogy previously described in United States v. Bissell62: if a bank 
robber is prohibited from paying an attorney with $100,000 that he 
stole, would it make sense for him to be allowed to dispose of those 
assets, and then use another $100,000 he happened to have lying 
around instead?63 The court determined that “the reasonable answer 
is no. The bank has the right to have those substitute, untainted assets 
kept available for return as well.”64 Just as with any defendant whose 
 
 54.  Billman, 915 F.2d at 922; see also United States v. Wingerter, 369 F. Supp. 2d 799, 810 
(E.D. Va. 2005) (“[T]he key distinction for determining whether pretrial restraint of property 
violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is not whether the property is tainted or 
untainted, but rather whether it is forfeitable or nonforfeitable.”). 
 55.  See Billman, 915 F.2d at 922 (“The funds in issue are not nonforfeitable assets. They 
are Billman’s substitute assets, which [are] subject[] to forfeiture.”). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  United States v. Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
 58.  Id. at 1327. 
 59.  Id. at 1327–28. 
 60.  Id. at 1325 (citation omitted). 
 61.  Id. at 1333–34. 
 62.  United States v. Bissel, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Forfeiture 
Hearing As to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
 63.  Luis, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (quoting Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1351). 
 64.  Id. 
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tainted assets had been restrained, the Court held that Luis would 
have to settle for appointed counsel.65 
The Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion affirming the 
district court.66 The circuit court considered Luis’s Sixth Amendment 
arguments to be foreclosed by cases like United States v. Monsanto 
and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States.67 Therefore, the 
court held that section 1345 “includes the authority to restrain 
‘property of equivalent value’ to that actually traceable to the alleged 
fraud.”68 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Luis’s Arguments 
Luis’s arguments focus on the harm that would come to criminal 
defendants should their substitute assets be restrained pretrial. The 
United States’ historical disdain for forfeiture also plays heavily in 
Luis’s arguments.69 Luis first contends that Monsanto and Caplin are 
not dispositive.70 She argues that those cases only decided the 
question of what may be done to tainted assets; therefore, the Court is 
presented with an entirely new question regarding substitute assets.71 
This distinction is critical for Luis’s success. 
Luis argues that the integrity of the criminal justice system relies 
on a defendant being able to choose and pay for his or her attorney.72 
She states that “[d]isplacing a defendant’s chosen advocate in a 
criminal case undermines the fairness of the proceeding and 
implicates protected expression.”73 The government’s asserted power 
would therefore “undermin[e] the adversarial system of justice.”74 
 
 65.  Id. at 1335. 
 66.  United States v. Luis, 564 F. App’x 493, 494 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. (quoting Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2012)). 
 69.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 21 (“The Founding Fathers 
so disdained in personam ‘forfeiture of estate’ penalties that they banned them in the 
Constitution . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663, 682–86 (1974) (discussing the history of American forfeiture). 
 70.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1–3, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. 
 71.  See id. at 3 (“But when this Court used the term ‘forfeitable’ in Monsanto and Caplin, 
this Court was referring exclusively to tainted assets.”). 
 72.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 15. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 18. 
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Implicit in this argument is a belief that public defenders cannot do 
the same level of work as private counsel, especially concerning 
complex federal charges.75 She argues that private attorneys ensure a 
level of trust and confidence needed between an attorney and client 
that is not as attainable by public defenders.76 
Luis then argues that the Court should fear what the government 
might do with this new power, for it could possibly lead to 
prosecutorial abuse.77 Luis describes that there must be some limit to 
what the government is able to do with a defendant’s legitimate 
funds.78 Although the Supreme Court has steadily increased 
prosecutors’ forfeiture power, her case presents the opportunity to 
establish some limit to that power.79 This limit would be that the 
government cannot reach its hand into a defendant’s own personal 
money and cripple her before her criminal trial has even begun.80 
Without this limit, Luis argues, the government has the ability to 
impoverish any defendant by accusation alone.81 
She finally presents an equity argument: although the government 
may have a speculative future interest in Luis’s substitute assets, these 
interests are outweighed by a defendant’s interest in securing his or 
her choice of counsel.82 She argues that the government’s desire for 
future restitution in the event of conviction just cannot stand up to 
“[a] criminal defendant’s present interest in her untainted assets for 
 
 75.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 10 (“[Pretrial restraint] takes from 
[the defendant] the funds she would otherwise invest in her defense for the best and most 
industrious investigators, experts, paralegals, and law clerks . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 76.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 26–27. 
 77.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 15 (“There is the possibility that 
prosecutors will seek broad, sweeping restraints recklessly or intentionally . . . .” (quoting 
United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1355 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Kaley v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 1090, 1110 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[F]ew things could do more to 
undermine the criminal justice system’s integrity . . . than to allow the Government to . . . disarm 
its presumptively innocent opponent by depriving him of his counsel of choice . . . .”). 
 78.  Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 70, at 13. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  See Oral Argument at 36:03, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/oral_argument_audio/24016 (“And you might be right 
that it just doesn’t make sense to draw a line here, but it leaves you with a situation in which 
more and more and more we’re depriving people of the ability to hire counsel of choice in 
complicated cases.”). 
 81.  See id. at 28:29 (“[I]t’s pretty hard for me to think in a country which says before he’s 
convicted, you have to release him on bail except in unusual circumstances, that nevertheless, 
you can take all his money away so he can’t hire a lawyer.”). 
 82.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at 30; see also id. at 14–15 (“The lower courts 
improperly elevated the Government’s speculative interest in collecting a potential criminal 
money judgment over Ms. Luis’s constitutional rights.”). 
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the purpose of retaining counsel.”83  At the very least, she argues the 
Court should be able to use its equitable powers to require that the 
prosecution release only those funds necessary to hire an attorney.84 
B.  The Government’s Arguments 
The government bases its arguments on the reasons behind 
forfeiture and a reading of Caplin and Monsanto which would 
foreclose Luis’s arguments. According to the government, Monsanto 
and Caplin were not decided as they were because the assets were 
tainted (i.e., the proceeds from a crime) but rather because the assets 
were forfeitable by statute.85 It is that they were forfeitable, and not 
that they were tainted, that made them immune from Sixth 
Amendment concerns.86 Similarly, Luis’s assets are not being seized 
because they are tainted, but as substitute assets, which section 853 
specifically condones.87 Read in this light, the Court has been 
presented nothing in this case that Caplin and Monsanto have not 
already decided.88 Additionally, the government, like the Eleventh 
Circuit, reads the various circuit holdings to show that the courts that 
have considered only the constitutional question (as opposed to 
statutory interpretation) have all agreed that substitute assets are 
restrainable.89 
The government next emphasizes the strong interests it has in 
pursuing forfeiture. It insists that it must restrain assets, whether 
substitute or not, to “preven[t] a continuing and substantial injury to 
the United States.”90 Therefore, it is not Luis’s desire for counsel that 
 
 83.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 22. 
 84.  Oral Argument, supra note 80, at 11:04 (Luis’s counsel arguing that at the very least 
Luis is requesting the assets necessary to retain her counsel of choice); id. at 37:33 (Roberts, 
C.J., questioning why the Government cannot at least release the small portion of assets for an 
attorney). 
 85.  Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 9–11. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 10–11. 
 88.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 30 (“And the reasoning underlying 
Monsanto’s approval of a pretrial freeze of assets determined likely to be forfeitable applies 
fully to substitute assets.”). 
 89.  See Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 14–16 (describing that 
no case has recognized a constitutional right to use assets forfeitable by statute to hire counsel); 
see also discussion supra Part III (explaining the Eleventh Circuit’s holding). But see supra note 
52 and accompanying text (listing the courts that have held otherwise, based primarily on 
statutory interpretation). 
 90.  Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1345 
(2012)). 
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trumps the government’s interests, as Luis suggests, but rather the 
strong governmental interests that trump Luis’s.91 
Lastly, the government cautions that deciding this case in Luis’s 
favor would set a troubling precedent. It would signal to savvy 
defendants that they could escape from asset forfeiture by quickly 
disposing of their assets, thereby shielding themselves from forfeiture 
and allowing them to hire any attorney that they desire.92 This 
specifically, the government alleges, is why courts must allow restraint 
of substitute assets: it ensures that the government can pursue 
forfeiture regardless of whether a defendant has already spent his ill-
gotten gains.93 Otherwise, it would “give rise to absurd results, if a 
defendant could dissipate her proceeds of crime, while retaining other 
assets, and then immunize herself from a properly substantiated asset 
freeze.”94 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold for the government and rule that substitute 
assets may be restrained pretrial. Ruling for the government would be 
in line with precedent, would respect the reasons behind forfeiture, 
and would not be unduly influenced by the hypothetical effects that 
Luis claims such a ruling would have. 
A.  The Bank Robber Hypothetical Expanded 
As previously described, the Southern District of Florida in United 
States v. Luis relied on an analogy of a bank robber who spends the 
money that he has stolen and then asserts that he should be free to 
use his other assets to attain his choice of counsel.95 The Southern 
District asserted that this should not be allowed.96 Luis’s argument 
cannot succeed against the loophole it would create. Criminal 
defendants would be encouraged to conceal, transfer, or destroy their 
tainted assets as swiftly as possible and thereby circumvent possible 
 
 91.  See id. at 8–9 (summarizing past holdings to make this point). 
 92.  See id. at 11–12 (“But if petitioner’s position were adopted, then a defendant could 
effectively deprive her victims of any opportunity for compensation simply by dissipating her ill-
gotten gains.”). 
 93.  See id. (“It is precisely to avoid that result that Congress provided for the pretrial 
restraint of substitute assets in cases like this one . . . .”). 
 94.  Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 15. 
 95.  See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
 96.  See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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future forfeiture.97 Congress specifically granted forfeiture of 
substitute assets, and in order for it to have any real effect, it must 
necessarily include pretrial restraint.98 
Part of the rationale of criminal forfeiture is to punish a defendant 
by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.99 Ruling in favor of Luis would 
ignore and prevent this goal. Instead, it would allow Luis to “wiel[d] 
undeserved economic power” by profiting both from her crime and 
from her decision to transfer those ill-gotten gains.100 
B.  The Right to Choice of Counsel is Not Absolute 
The Court should also consider that the Sixth Amendment right to 
choice of counsel is limited: a defendant cannot insist on counsel that 
he or she cannot afford.101 Even Luis and various supporting amici 
acknowledge this.102 As Monsanto and Caplin have held, the Sixth 
Amendment does not include the right to spend another’s money to 
retain an attorney, even when doing so is the only available means of 
retaining that attorney.103 This ruling establishes that when a 
defendant’s assets are subject to pretrial restraint, his or her right to 
choice of counsel is not infringed. The government’s position in Luis 
is an extension of this rationale. Forfeiture is premised upon the 
understanding that defendants facing forfeiture do not truly own the 
money they wish to use, for that money is rightfully the government’s 
from the moment the crime occurs.104 Luis, then, is no different from 
 
 97.  See United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (“To conclude otherwise 
would invite defendants who anticipate conviction for their unlawful drug-trafficking activities 
to undertake the obvious step of transferring their assets . . . thereby circumventing the 
important economic impact of forfeiture”); see also King, supra note 3, at 272–74 (making the 
same argument). 
 98.  See King, supra note 3, at 267 (“[T]he courts that have allowed pretrial restraint on 
substitute assets . . . have reasoned that the prior restraint must be construed broadly if their 
true purpose is to be fulfilled.”). 
 99.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 36–38. 
 100.  Id. at 36 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 
(1989)). 
 101.  See supra text accompanying note 33. But see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006) (recognizing the right to select counsel of one’s choice as “the root 
meaning of the constitutional guarantee”). 
 102.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys in Support 
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–9, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys] (recognizing a 
client may not choose an attorney who is not a member of the bar, an attorney who declines 
representation, or an attorney with a conflict of interest). 
 103.  See supra Part II for explanation. 
 104.  United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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any other indigent defendant who must be appointed counsel—no 
right has been taken away. 
Luis’s argument next turns to what would happen should she be 
left without choice of counsel: she would be forced to take a public 
defender.105 Luis and amici assert that this would be unfair because 
public defenders are overworked and have limited resources.106 This 
argument fails to acknowledge that federal public defenders, who 
would be appointed to this case, are known for much better 
representation and better funding than the local public defenders who 
are often the subject of public ridicule.107 Additionally, should Luis 
instead be represented by a court-appointed private attorney, this 
attorney would be paid at $125 an hour.108 Furthermore, Luis’s 
arguments that private attorneys would undoubtedly do a better job 
than court-appointed alternatives is unsupported by the evidence.109 
And regardless, as long as Luis has been appointed competent 
counsel, then no Sixth Amendment right has been deprived.110 
C.  Potential for Abuse is Not Enough 
Luis’s next argument, that prosecutors will exercise this new 
power in unjust ways,111 also does not provide enough to warrant a 
ruling in her favor. Amici argue that “funding law enforcement 
through forfeiture creates perverse and dangerous governmental 
incentives at the local, state, and federal level,”112 and that this power 
may be used as a “questionable litigation tactic meant . . . to pressure 
[defendants] into a plea-bargain.”113 
 
 105.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text for more on this argument. 
 106.  See, e.g., Brief of New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 10–11, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015) (discussing limited 
resources of public defenders); Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, supra 
note 7, at 22–23 (same). 
 107.  See David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and 
the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 376 (2014) (asserting that federal public defenders provide a 
“good model” for local public defenders because they “have generally been at a level sufficient 
to support high quality representation of indigent defendants in federal criminal cases.”). 
 108.  Id. at 381. 
 109.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 40–41 and citations within (presenting 
evidence that court-appointed lawyers perform just as well as private counsel). 
 110.  United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 111.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense Attorneys, supra 
note 102, at 12–13 (discussing possible prosecutorial behavior with this change). 
 112.  Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et. al. at 4–
5, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015). 
 113.  Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute and the DKT Liberty Project in Support of 
Petitioner at 35, Luis v. United States, No. 14-419, (U.S. Aug. 25, 2015). 
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There are two reasons to discount this argument. First, there are 
already many tools in a prosecutor’s arsenal that could potentially be 
used in an abusive manner.114 But “[t]he fact that [an] . . . [a]ct might 
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it . . . invalid.”115 As stated in 
Caplin, the federal forfeiture statutes are not made unconstitutional 
“merely because in some cases prosecutors may abuse the processes 
available to them.”116 Instead, trial courts can deal with specific 
allegations of abuse and misconduct on a case-by-case basis.117 
Consequently, everything Luis asserts here has already been 
determined against her. 
Second, the Department of Justice specifically recognizes the 
possibility for abuse in asset forfeiture and has written guidelines to 
counteract it.118 For instance, seeking forfeiture requires approval 
from Department of Justice headquarters, and Department of Justice 
guidelines list various aspects to consider in determining when to 
exempt assets from forfeiture.119 These guidelines admittedly cannot 
resolve every concern, but they “substantially reduce the number of 
potential ethical issues that inject ambiguities into the attorney’s role 
as advocate.”120 They should therefore be considered “checks on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion”121 and should calm the fears that 
Luis asserts. 
Prosecutors wield power in the criminal justice system, but they 
also acknowledge this power and take steps to govern it. The Court 
should not use the mere potential for abuse of this power as a reason 
to hold for Luis. 
 
 114.  Bissell, 866 F.2d at 1354–55. 
 115.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 116.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989); see also 
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988) (“We do not agree, however, that 
the possibility of abuse renders the criminal forfeiture statute unconstitutional . . . . We do not 
assume that the government will abuse its discretion.”). 
 117.  Caplin, 491 U.S. at 635. 
 118.  Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1508, n.14; see generally Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, 2013, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
afmls/legacy/2014/05/23/policy-manual-2013rev.pdf (describing the Department of Justice’s asset 
forfeiture policies). 
 119.  Welling, supra note 2, at 600. 
 120.  Kathleen F. Brickley, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE 
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 541–42 (1986). 
 121.  Id. 
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D.  A Reweighing of Interests 
The Court must also consider the policy arguments underlying 
asset forfeiture. Holding for Luis would allow defendants to profit off 
of their crimes, but allowing the government to restrain substitute 
assets would be consistent with Congress’s goals in creating asset 
forfeiture laws.122 The government has a legitimate pecuniary interest 
in forfeiture “that extends to recovering all forfeitable assets, for such 
assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-enforcement efforts 
in a variety of important and useful ways.”123 The Court should 
consider why the United States pursues forfeiture at all: to deter 
crime and return property to its rightful owners.124 
Luis argues that these governmental interests are future and 
speculative,125 and not comparable to her current interest in securing 
an attorney.126 Therefore, she states that a balancing of interests should 
favor judgment in her favor.127 This argument incorrectly values the 
interests at play. A ruling for the government would not abandon 
Luis’s interest in counsel, but only alter it to require that she retain 
appointed counsel. In the eyes of the law, she will still receive a 
competent attorney and a fair trial. Conversely, allowing Luis to use 
her assets would entirely destroy the government’s interests. The 
government will not be able to compensate any victims (the assets 
will have already been depleted), use the assets to improve 
communities, provide for police training, deter crime, nor send a 
message that crime does not pay. Even a limited release of the funds 
needed to pay for counsel would necessarily lessen the compensation 
of victims, and the Government may reasonably fear that a defendant 
would blow through assets unnecessarily solely to keep it out of the 
government’s hands. At the very least, Luis would become a message 
that crime pays. It pays by providing the best criminal attorney 
 
 122.  King, supra note 3, at 271–72. 
 123.  Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989). 
 124.  See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) (“The Government also uses 
forfeited property to recompense victims of crime, improve conditions in crime-damaged 
communities, and support law enforcement activities like police training.”); United States v. 
Schmitz, 153 F.R.D. 136, 140–41 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (discussing the rationale behind pretrial 
restraint of substitute assets.); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text for more rationale 
behind forfeiture. 
 125.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Associations of Criminal Defense, supra note 102, at 16. 
 126.  See id. at 17. 
 127.  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
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available. A proper weighing of interests, therefore, favors upholding 
the government’s ability to restrain Luis’s assets. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues presented in Luis v. United States serve as a useful 
springboard for considering the pros and cons of asset forfeiture and 
how the practice affects criminal defendants. Although Luis presents 
strong arguments on bounds of governmental power and the rights to 
which a defendant should be entitled, the Court cannot alter what has 
already been established: a defendant does not have an unlimited 
opportunity to use personal funds for his choice of counsel.128 Instead, 
the result Luis desires would require legislative change.129 
Luis and certain amici rely largely on a frightening vision of what 
the criminal justice system would turn into should prosecutors be able 
to restrain substitute assets.130 But the Court should not be swayed by 
this speculative dystopian prediction. It should instead focus its 
analysis on the reasons for asset forfeiture, on preventing Luis from 
profiting off of her crime, on the Department of Justice’s existing 
policies to reduce potential abuse, and, most importantly, on the 
limitations on the right to counsel—a right which would be 
adequately preserved by appointed counsel. Therefore, the Court 
should affirm the Eleventh Circuit and allow the federal government 
to restrain Luis’s substitute assets. 
 
 
 128.  Kathleen F. Brickley, Attorneys’ Fee Forfeitures: On Defining “What” and “When” and 
Distinguishing “Ought” from “Is,” 36 EMORY L.J. 761, 778–79 (1987). 
 129.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 15, at 41 (“If Congress believed that a 
defendant like petitioner should always have access to some or all of the property in her hands 
to pay for an attorney of her choice, it could change the law.”); see also Todd Barnet & Ivan 
Fox, Trampling On the Sixth Amendment: The Continued Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 22 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 80 (1995) (making the same argument). 
 130.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Justice Foundation, supra note 3, at 17. 
